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The Ways of Revenge in Chilas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan: 
Shia-Sunni Clashes as Blood Feuds
Muhammad Azam Chaudhary
Introduction
From 1981 to 1995 I have been a member of the Pakistani-German Study 
Group engaged in exploring the different regions and aspects of Gilgit-Bal-
tistan’s (GB) society and cultures. In this project, I was part of the sub-group 
documenting rock-carvings and inscriptions discovered in Chilas, District 
Diamer. Besides helping the documentation of the rock-carvings and inscrip-
tions, I was also exploring different aspects of the life of the people of Chilas. 
One of the topics of my research during this time was blood feuds. My initial 
attention to this topic was drawn by the driver of our project named Akram1. 
He was a very fascinating character. He was initially hired along with his 
very old jeep to drive part of our team (mainly two German cartographers) to 
different working stations. He was a total illiterate but brilliant in picking up 
words of English and German to narrate fascinating stories. Many of those 
stories were, unfortunately, stories of murder. He generally started these sto-
ries like this: “Buttogah, two Muslims full-finish – tischu, tischu” (Two people 
were killed in Buttogah; “tischu” is the imitation of the sound of bullets). For 
those injured during such conflicts he would say: “five Muslims half-finish”. 
In the beginning these stories sounded like fiction to me especially because 
I came from a very different cultural background in Pakistan (Punjab). But 
then one day, a friend was murdered on suspicion of illicit sexual relations. 
Sometimes later, Zafaran, who worked for the project, killed his sister and 
her paramour in their fields for alleged illicit sex. With these, at least, last two 
cases I felt myself dragged into exploring about blood feuds.
In the autumn of 2013, I revisited Gilgit-Chilas after a break of almost 
two decades and found it very different from those days. The most strik-
ing and conspicuous of all the changes was the overshadowing presence of 
military in the form of security posts at almost every corner and crossing 
where private and public transport vehicles were stopped and searched. In-
telligence agency personnel visited us in the hotels almost on a daily basis. 
Vehicles, especially, buses, vans and cars traveled on the Karakorum High-
way (KKH) as caravans escorted by heavy police contingents. The vehicles 
were searched and passengers were registered, at least, at twenty different 
spots on the KKH. 
1 All the names used in this article are fictive. 
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This was mainly due to the Shia-Sunni violence in GB. Many terrible acts 
of violence had occurred over the last two years (2012-2013). On February 
28, 2012, eighteen Shias were killed on the Karakoram Highway in Kohistan 
district. On April 3, nine passengers were killed in Gonar Farm area close to 
Chilas. On August 16, some buses were intercepted at Babusar and twenty-
two people were killed. In the year 1988 I was almost a participant observer 
in the preparations for the big lashkar that attacked Shia villages near Gilgit 
in which more than hundred people were killed. District Diamer and Ko-
histan, especially Chilas, was reported as the epicenter of most of the vio-
lence against the Shias. In this paper I want to explain why Kohistan and 
Diamer are so prominent in this violence and especially why such big mobs 
come together for this violence. 
Much has been written on causes of Shia-Sunni sectarian violence in 
Pakistan at the macro level. Shia-Sunni violence has also been analyzed with 
particular reference to GB by several scholars (Grieser and Sökefeld [forth-
coming], Sökefeld 2010, PILDAT 2011, Hunzai 2013, The Express Tribune 
2012). Different reasons and dimensions of the Shia-Sunni violence in GB 
have been highlighted in this literature. The factors mentioned in this litera-
ture could be grouped into the background, the Pakistani political structure 
and the outside factors categories. The background group may relate to the 
spreading of Islam, the distribution of different Muslim sects in the region 
and the role of the colonial government and administration. The role of Paki-
stani state and its establishment especially the military, for instance, Zia Ul 
Haq’s politics of Islamization makes the second group. The external factors 
category include the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran on Pakistani 
soil, the strategic location of the region, i.e. its being part of the disputed 
territory between Pakistan and India, and its proximity to the China’s bor-
der. Such an analysis, though relevant, fails to explain the micro-sociological 
dynamics of the conflict which in my view are important for a proper under-
standing of the situation. 
The focus of this paper is on what may be termed as the ‘structure of 
violence’, i.e. cultural dynamics of the Shia-Sunni violence with a particu-
lar focus on the Sunni population who inhabit predominantly the southern 
parts of GB, i.e. the district Diamer and its adjoining areas. My assumption 
in this regards is that Shia-Sunni clashes and killings are carried out like 
blood feuds by the people of Diamer who live in a tribal set up called Yagh-
estan (the lawless people). This is a very dynamical society especially with 
reference to the formation of groups which change according to the demand 
of the circumstances. This is comparable to what Evans-Pritchard (1940) has 
described about the Nuer, the so called principle of fission and fusion. Any 
groups, according to Evans-Pritchard, tends to split into opposed parts, these 
parts tend to fuse in relation to other groups. (1940: 148) The link between 
Shia-Sunni clashes and blood feuds became clear to me during my recent 
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visit (2013) to Chilas where I could interview a number of local people on 
topics like the planned construction of the Diamer-Basha-Dam on the Indus, 
Shia-Sunni clashes and blood feuds. For the people of Chilas the answer was 
very simple: 
“Sunni are very frequently killed in Gilgit but because the gov-
ernment, administration and even media in Gilgit are almost 
completely in the hands of Shias, they are silently buried. But 
since the Sunni in Gilgit are from our area and have relatives 
here we get information. We stand in an obligation to take the 
revenge of these killings according to the local custom. Since the 
conflict is not personal the entire community shares this obliga-
tion.” (Field notes) 
I tend to agree with Abou Zahab’s (2010: 164) views that Shia-Sunni violence 
in GB is the result of a multiplicity of factors, most of them not related to 
religion. Therefore these have to be taken into account while analyzing sec-
tarianism at the grassroots level. This proves, for instance, that the lashkar 
(civilian armed force) attacking Shia villages in 1988 were not something 
unique about the Shia-Sunni conflict. It happens on and off in tribal socie-
ties that an entire group or even valley takes up arms against another group 
of the equal size. This was also demonstrated by a very recent clash between 
Diamer and Kohistan, two neighboring regions of which one is part of GB 
and the other of the adjoining Province Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Both 
of them are Sunni. The headline in the newspaper The Gilgit-Baltistan Bul-
letin 2014 read: “Gilgit-Baltistan boundary claim between KPK and GB costs 
7 lives.” According to the details at least seven people were killed and a large 
number were injured in a clash between armed civil forces (lashkar) of dis-
trict Diamer and district Kohistan. It was a dispute over the location of the 
boundary between two villages. The Diamer farmers claimed that the Ko-
histanis captured four hundred of their goats which they refused to return. 
A lashkar from Diamer attacked Kohistanis who had already come together 
expecting the reaction from Diamer (Gilgit Baltistan Bulletin: 2014). 
I want to propose that blood feuds are part of a larger concept called 
badal or revenge in the local culture. Revenge is a behavior which demands 
ideally ‘a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye’, but in actual practice the re-
venge, as it was so aptly described by Durkheim, has “the tendency to surpass 
in severity the action against which it is reacting (…). That is because the pas-
sion which is the soul of punishment ceases only when exhausted. (…) it often 
extends further than the culpable and reaches the innocent, his wife, his chil-
dren his neighbours, etc.” (1933: 86) Badal does not only mean killing; it can 
be as simple as for instance an angry look for an angry look, or calling a bad 
name for calling a bad name. The case studies in the coming pages, especially 
No. 1 and No. 3, are also examples of badal. In the Case Study 3 a man runs 
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away with the future bride of another man. The jirga (council of village elders 
and respectables) decides that instead the sister of the man who ran away be 
given in marriage to the aggrieved. In Case Study 1 three brothers pronounce 
ghag (publicly declaring a woman as future wife without her and her family’s 
consent) on the three daughters of their uncle who refused to marry them to 
his nephews. But of course the worst and not so uncommon form of revenge 
in tribal society is murder which is often linked to issues of marriage and 
sexuality of the women of one’s family or of the opponents. For this study 
the relevant aspect of the revenge is the obligation of revenge i.e. the ques-
tion of whose duty it is to take revenge, especially of murder. It is, first of all, 
the sons, father and brothers who must take revenge but if they are not in a 
position to do so automatically cousins are involved and after them the larger 
segments of the society and finally the entire population. This depends on the 
size and structure of the opponents. Where and how did the tribal structure 
and blood feuds come to this area? Let us start with the ethnographic setting 
of the area.  
Ethnographic Setting
I have done my field research in Chilas where I also lived and worked for 
more than fifteen years until some eighteen years ago. Last year, in 2013, I 
revisited Chilas for a few days and was thereby able to refresh some of the 
data among others on topics of Shia-Sunni violence, blood feuds and the Dia-
mer-Bash-Dam. Chilas is located approximately 130 km south of Gilgit. It is 
the headquarters of the Diamer District. According to the population census 
of 1981 it had a total population of less than 150,000 people2 which included 
the subdivisions of Astor, Tangir-Darel and Chilas. Astor in the meantime 
has been made a separate district. 
The most evident change I immediately noticed coming back to Chi-
las after such a long time was the expanded bazaars and presence of mobile 
phones. The most discussed topic at this time was the Diamer-Basha-Dam; 
especially the compensation money given for the land and houses which will 
be inundated by the reservoir to be built on the Indus river below Chilas. 
The people were very enthusiastic about the dam because most of them were 
receiving a handsome amount of compensation money. They were also dis-
cussing the future job prospects related to the construction of the dam. In-
teresting in this regards was the dispute about the area where the Diamer-
Bash-Dam is to be built as both GB and KPK claimed this territory. This is 
important for the decision about who will get the royalty for electricity pro-
duced from the dam. Interesting was that in this controversy the people of 
Chilas took a united stand with the people of GB against KPK, their allies 
against the Shias in Shia-Sunni violence.
2 According to the Census Report, 1981, the total population of district Diamer 
was 122,690 (quoted in: Khan 1992-a: 293).
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In the year 1981, when I first time came to Chilas, there was hardly any mar-
ket. The KKH had only recently been completed. An important consequence 
of the construction of the KKH was the easy transport of the very precious 
forest wood to the down-country markets. This God given easy money from 
selling timber was mainly spent on the purchase of ‘modern’ weapons espe-
cially the highly prized Kalashnikovs which had been easily available since 
the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These weapons were 
highly valued because of their use for deterrence and revenge. These weap-
ons were openly discussed and displayed on every possible occasions, such 
as marriage, birth of a male child or a dispute. One of my key informants told 
me proudly that there were as many Kalashnikov in his house as the number 
of males – they were eight brothers. The acquisition of such weapons led to 
an unprecedented increase in the number of blood feuds in the region. Some 
of the money though was also spent on the education but only of male chil-
dren. There is a girls’ school but female education has no priority especially 
among the dominant indigenous population groups (Yeshkuns and Shins). 
This was slightly different among the non-indigenous people living in the 
area who do not possess any land and are therefore called ghair-malik (non-
owners). Among them are groups like the Soniwal, but the largest of these 
groups was the Pukhtuns. Except those involved in the timber business, most 
of the Pukhtun population were of lower economic status. They were often 
dependent on the indigenous population. A Pukhtun informant told me once 
that the indigenous population considers the Pukhtuns beghairat (without 
honour), for Pukhtuns send their women to schools for education, take them 
to hospitals if required and sometimes even take them out in their cars (if 
they have) for important occasions. One can imagine the conservativeness 
of the indigenous population from the fact that seclusion of women among 
Pukhtuns is well known as is also the high rate of blood feuds among them, 
but Yeshkun and Shin certainly take pride in being even more conservative 
and having an even higher rate of blood feud. 
The area belonging to the Chilas sub-division of the Diamer district has 
been deforested to a very large extent and the timber-money has already 
been consumed. The construction of Diamer-Bhasha-Dam is going to affect 
the land and houses of Chilas for which compensation money is being paid. 
Compared to the timber money which was mainly spent on the purchase of 
weapons most of the dam compensation money is used for buying cars and 
houses. I was told by some of my old informants that the institution of feuds 
is no more as highly rated as it used to be but I had the impression that actu-
ally no big change had taken place. I got this impression after trying to meet 
Hussain Ahmed who was my host and key informant during my research 
in 1980s. I traced him through his mobile phone but he did not disclose his 
whereabouts. He did not share even with his closest friends where he was, 
neither when, how and on which route he would be coming to an appoint-
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ment. This was the first principle of blood revenge custom: Never trust any-
body. I remember he told me never to come to his house in the dark and not 
to bring other people along.
The entire region south of Gilgit, which mainly includes the districts of 
Diamer (Tangir, Darel, Chilas) and Indus-Kohistan has been very different 
from other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. It is, for instance, the only part of GB 
where the population is hundred percent Sunni. Similarly this area is differ-
ent in terms of socio-political structure. It was the only region of the GB that 
was tribal and that had no formal system of centralized government. The 
other parts of GB like Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Shigar, Khaplu, Skardu, Yasin 
and Punial were all kingdoms in the past. It was called Yaghestan, that is, 
the land of lawlessness and warfare. A significant aspect of the Yaghestani 
way of life is the institution of badal or blood feud. A Punjabi journalist who 
visited the area wrote: “They love their feuds more than their children, they 
rather produce children for a successful vengeance and for producing many 
children they marry several wives” (Deed Shneed, 1992).  The highest mur-
der rate prevailed in Tangir and Darel, with Chilas having the second highest 
rate. Blood feuds do not exist in Astor.3 
It is important to note that the ethnographic research4 for the present 
study was carried out mainly in Chilas and, therefore, the analysis and con-
clusion are limited to that area. The population of the subdivision of Chilas 
was approximately 50,000 according to the 1981 census. The subdivision in-
cludes the town of Chilas and a number of valleys, such as Butogah, Thak, 
Gichi, Thor, Hodur, Thalpan and Ges. In the views of my informants the av-
erage number of murders per year was more than thirty persons. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind also the large number of persons who survive the killing 
attempts.
There are only few families who are not involved in a blood feud. People 
do not dare to go out into the streets in the dark. Weapons are their perma-
nent companions. They carry at least a pistol or a revolver under their shirts 
3 Data about population and area have been taken from Khan 1992a. The 
statistics about the number of murders per year are from the Chilas Police 
records I could consult but generally not made public. Chilas had a population 
of 43,000 in 1981, and there were 24 and 25 murder cases in 1993 and 1994, 
respectively. Tangir-Darel had a population of 37,000 in 1981, and there were 
23 and 30 murder cases in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Similarly, Astor had 
a population of 47,000 in 1981, with one murder registered in 1993 and two 
registered in 1994.
4 Since 1982 I stayed every year for two to three months in Chilas as a member 
of the Pakistan-German study group, the Research Cell of the Heidelberg 
Academy of Humanities and Sciences, documenting rock-carvings and 
inscriptions in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, especially in the region of 
Chilas. Special attention to the collection of material on blood feuds was given 
during my stays over the last four years of that period. 
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during the day and sleep with a gun at their side at night. Those who are on 
the revenging side of the feud try to keep themselves informed about the ac-
tivities of the other party, in order to waylay them. They employ spies for get-
ting information about their opponents whereas the other party tries to keep 
its activities a secret. There is strong social pressure to take revenge if it is 
due. And people are practically forced by this pressure to take revenge. Blood 
revenge is taken by the nearest relatives, such as the son, brother, father, un-
cle, or cousin, and often it is done collectively. Before coming to the question 
of what blood feuds are and how they are linked to the Shia-Sunni violence, 
let me first pursue the question how and why blood feuds came to this area.
The Genesis of Blood Feuds
I have already mentioned in the last section that the central, northern and 
eastern valleys of GB were all princely states each ruled by a more or less 
hereditary (elder son inherits rule after the death of the father) ruler. The 
southern regions of GB (Diamer, but also adjoining Kohistan) were without a 
central government and were called “republican” or “acephalous” societies in 
the literature. Different sects of Islam spread in the above mentioned regions 
from 14th to 19th century. Baltistan became predominantly a Shia, Diamer a 
Sunni, and Gilgit (except Nager which is Shia) an Ismaili region.5 We know 
from oral traditions as well as written records that before Islamization the 
region of Diamer and Kohistan also had princely states. I was told by sev-
eral people from Chilas that Karar, a Hindu, was the last ruler of Chilas. The 
names of ruins such as Shahi Mahal (royal palace) in Darel speak for them-
selves. Asad Ali Khan, a local scholar, writes: “A long time ago a Hindu Raja 
Chachi ruled Chilas. At his death there was a war between his two sons Mat 
Chack and Booth. The latter was successful and became the last ruler of the 
area” (Khan 1992-a: 291, English translation by the author. See also Biddulph 
1977: 16). Similarly according to John Staley: 
“The early travelers recorded traditions that several of the 
acephalous states were formerly governed by rulers .... In Darel 
people point out ‘the ruler’s polo ground’; in Chilas they have 
preserved the name of a ruler; and in Kandia they still tell sto-
ries of Kandi...” (Staley 1982: 183)
5 Regional administrative boundaries should not be taken in the strict sense. 
By Gilgit I do not only mean the town of Gilgit but the upper Gilgit Valley, 
Yasin, Punial, Hunza, etc. The town of Gilgit is inhabited by all the ethnic and 
religious groups as a result of its centrality. In Baltistan, besides Shias, there 
are a lot of Nurbakhsis, some even estimate them to be one-fourth of the total 
population. There were some sectarian changes in the history of the area, but 
the general character of the area remained as already described. 
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The question arises why the new religion (Islam) should lead to the change of 
the political structure in the south, for example in the present Diamer Dis-
trict, but not in the northern and eastern parts, the areas of Baltistan and 
Gilgit. Staley again gives a possible explanation:
“(...) missionaries and religious leaders came from countries to 
the north and west where Islam was well established under cen-
tralized rule (....) and so they would not have thought it necessary 
to make political changes. (…) On the other hand the southern 
valleys were converted by missionaries who came from further 
south, from the territories occupied by the Pathans. Indeed most 
of these missionaries were Pathans, and they approached their 
task in a different way (...) No doubt their thrones and adminis-
trations were destroyed too, for these Pathan missionaries, as 
well as introducing a more orthodox form of Islam, seem to have 
imposed wholesale the institutions and practices that they were 
familiar with in the Pathan territories further south.” (Staley 
1982: 185-87)
The further evidence of Pukhtun or Pukhtun also known as Pathan mission-
aries introducing the new socio-political structure is the existence or former 
existence of some of the following typical Pukhtun institutions: the wesh sys-
tem (the system of periodical re-allotment of land, now no more practiced in 
Diamer); kalang lands (a contract according to which a piece of land is given 
for a fixed amount of money for an indefinite time under certain conditions), 
and joint community land and water rights, with the division of the commu-
nity into owners and non-owners of these rights. The wesh system is a typical 
Pukhtun institution that was introduced in Swat, which lies around two hun-
dred kilometers south of Chilas, after its conquest by Pukhtuns between A.D 
1500 and 1600.6 The available literature on the history of the area reflects 
that the wesh system existed here7 before it was abolished even in Swat, the 
area of its origin.8 Hence, if we accept that an acephalous system and Islam 
were brought to the region by the Pukhtuns and that the blood feuds began 
after this religious-political change,9 the question arises whether the blood 
6 For details see Ahmed 1976; Barth 1959; Ahmad 1962.
7 See Jettmar 1983; Zarin & Schmidt 1984; Staley 1982: 196.
8 For details see Ahmed (1976: 37) and Barth (1985: 69).
9 Thull (in Dir, a part of present Swat) offers another example of Pukhtun Sunni 
Islam giving birth to blood feuds. Keiser writes about the genesis of organized 
venge ance in Thull: "The cultural values, concepts, and ideas so important to 
organized vengeance in contemporary Thull were probably introduced at the 
same time Pukhtun missionaries converted the Kohistanis to Islam. Their 
effect on existing social organization and culture set in motion processes 
of change that ultimately resulted in a new, unique Kohistani sociocultural 
system". (Keiser 1991: 46-47).
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feuds were a by-product of the new religion (Sunni Islam), or the result of the 
Pukhtun acephalous political culture. The two are very often mixed together 
but this differentiation is important because of its political implications, on 
the one hand, and in seeking an end to this custom, on the other hand as I 
will explain it now. 
Let us start with the assumption that Sunni Islam gave birth to the blood 
feuds. As previously mentioned, the district of Diamer consisted of three 
subdivisions, Astor, Tangir-Darel, and Chilas. I have already written that in 
Astor which was, in terms of population and area, the biggest of the three 
subdivisions, the average number of murders per year is between one and 
two which is actually not part of the system of organized vengeance we are 
dealing with here. It is interesting that the Astoris, too, are Sunnis (though 
with a sizeable Shia presence), but theirs is a Sunni Islam that came to As-
tor via Kashmir. The other existence of Sunni Islam is in the Kaghan Valley, 
the southeastern neighbor of Chilas. There again, we find no system of blood 
feuds. Kaghan, too, received Sunni Islam via Kashmir. It is interesting that 
even Chilas received the first wave of Islam via the Babusar Pass (i.e. from 
the Kaghan side10), but later on, the Pukhtun influence from the south be-
came more dominant. This is perhaps one of the reasons that until the end 
of the nineteenth century the blood feuds in Chilas were less frequent than 
today as was observed by Biddulph: “The crime of murder is rare, and the 
readiness to spill blood on slight occasions so noticeable among the Afghans 
is unknown” (Biddulph 1977: 18).
In concluding the analysis, it might be said that the acephalous or tribal 
political structure, introduced by the Pukhtuns, is responsible for the origin 
of the blood feuds in Chilas. This may be called a confirmation of, in the lit-
erature, widely debated positive link between the segmentary lineage system 
and the blood feuds that Knuden (2011: 2-7) has thoroughly reviewed. With-
out going into further details of the origin of feuds I want to come back to our 
main focus which is the link between Shia-Sunni violence and blood feuds. In 
order to understand this link it is important to understand the whole concept 
of blood feuds first. I have chosen to start by introducing some cases related 
to blood feuds.. 
Three Case Studies: a Prologue
The following cases are not about the Shia-Sunni violence in GB but in my 
view their study and analysis is important because they help us understand 
the core values of this society. The cases below have been chosen from the 
10 Asad Ali Khan writes: "Syed Noor Shah, known as Ghazi Baba, was the first 
man who started preaching Islam in Thak and built the first mosque which 
is still there (though some changes have been made). Ghazi Baba belonged to 
the Syed family of Kaghan. In Tangir and Darel, Islam came from the Swat 
direction." (Khan 1992: 291, English translation by the author)
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newspapers. There are several reasons for selecting these cases from the 
newspapers in spite of some possible inaccuracies in these cases. The first 
and most important reason is that cases of revenge are almost always related 
to women (as is also the case in our cases) which are very sensitive and can 
easily lead to very dangerous consequences especially in a relatively small 
community where I have done my research. Besides that the three cases cho-
sen here represent cases that occur very seldom like for instance the case 
of ghag (publicly declaring a woman as one’s future wife without her and 
her family’s consent) and swara (giving of a woman as a wife to an opposed 
party in order to end a feud) but they represent the basic values of this so-
ciety. The cases of revenge and blood feuds in Pakistan are found mainly 
among Pukhtuns and their neighboring territories where the impact of their 
culture reached as far as, for instance, the districts of Diamer and Kohistan. 
It is interesting and as it has already been mentioned that the instance of 
blood feuds is even higher in areas influenced by Pukhtun culture though 
Pukhtuns may not be the dominant population groups there as for instance 
is the case of Dir-Kohistan, Swat-Kohistan, Indus-Kohistan and Diamer. As 
I wrote above, some of my Pukhtun informants even told me that the lo-
cal people consider them beghairat (without honour) especially because the 
Pukhtuns sometimes take their women to hospitals or send them to schools. 
Case 1
A Pakistani daily, ‘The News’ (2013) reported that three persons used the 
word of ghag on the three daughters of their uncle and wanted to marry the 
girls without their consent and free will. Ghag is a custom whereby a person 
declares by spoken or written words or firing in the air in public that a partic-
ular woman stands engaged to him. This is done without her or her parents’ 
free will. This declaration implies that her parents and other close relatives 
are threatened not to give her hand in marriage to any other person and that 
no other man should make a marriage proposal nor marry her. Ghag has 
been declared as an offence by the Provincial Assembly of KPK in 2013 and 
is punishable with up to seven years imprisonment or Rs 5000,000 fine, or 
both. Thus it is very rare but sometimes still practiced.
Case 2 
‘The News’ (2013) reported that Ms. Amsala was engaged to Mr. Rahmatul-
lah. Rehman a close relative of Rahmatullah, developed a love affair with the 
girl and they ran away together. After a few days the father, an uncle and a 
cousin of Rahmatullah found and killed both Amsala and Rehman. Interest-
ingly, the police arrested Rehman’s brother because he did not register the 
case against the killers. 
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Case 3
In the daily “Dawn” (August 2011) it was reported that six members of a jirga, 
including a local prayer leader, were arrested for giving a female in swara 
to a rival family for settling a dispute. According to the details the dispute 
originated after a woman had eloped with a man called Imran although she 
was already engaged with her cousin Tariq. The jirga was convened to settle 
the dispute. The jirga decided to give Imran s´  sister  in marriage to Tariq. 
The police arrested the members of the jirga for violating the 310-A section 
of Pakistan Penal Code which prohibits giving of females to rival families for 
settling feuds. 
Embedding the Cases
Lindholm wrote that the most basic principle of social organization of Swat – 
and the social organization of Diamer is very close to it – is the:
“(…) principle of ‘complementary opposition’ (…). Each lineage 
or khel stands in a relation of opposition to its closest neighbour 
of an equal level. Thus the different sections of a village are in 
opposition, but will unite should they be threatened by another 
village. (…) this system not only structures political, economic, 
and social life, not only organizes people spatially, but also pro-
vides a worldview, pervades child raising, forms values, and 
permeates all possible spheres of human activity and thought” 
(Lindholm 1982: xxvii). 
In the following paragraphs while explaining and analyzing the above men-
tioned three cases I have referred to many other cases too for elaborating 
my point. These other cases I have collected during my fieldwork. Jirga is 
an old institution for conflict-resolution in the area and consists of village el-
ders and respectable persons. Swara is a custom according to which women 
(mainly sisters or daughters) are given in marriage to the opponent families 
in order to end blood feuds or, as in case study 3, to settle a case of elopement 
which falls in the general category of illicit sexual relationships. According to 
the local value system, sexual relationships between a male and a female are 
only allowed after marriage. Marriages are arranged by families (mainly the 
parents) to the extent of almost excluding the consent or even the knowledge 
of the future couple. Engagements which precede marriage are taken very 
seriously and once engaged the rights and responsibilities of the future bride 
shift from her father/brother to her future husband and his family. 
In very rare cases though, a man who is refused the hand of a woman 
may fire a gun in the air at her doorstep declaring the proposed woman to 
be his bride (case study 1). After this any other male wishing to marry this 
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woman will do so only at the risk of his life. But the man who claims that 
woman as his bride is himself on a death row because the custom demands 
his killing by the woman’s family. Breaking an engagement is comparable to 
a divorce which is considered the most serious abuse only for the man in this 
case. If an engaged woman elopes with another man, or is married to another 
person, this requires badal which generally means the killing of both the 
engaged woman and her paramour by the originally chosen husband (case 
study 2). Swara which is practiced very rarely provides an alternative solu-
tion to badal. According to this custom a young unmarried woman (or sev-
eral women) will be given in marriage to a man (or several men) of an enemy 
family in order to settle a dispute which generally demands the killing of one 
or more male members of this woman’s family. In elopement cases the swara 
woman, generally the sister of the man accused, is given to the fiancée or 
husband whose fiancée or wife had eloped or married someone else.
A noteworthy aspect of the case study 3 is that the alleged swara vic-
tim rejected the charges that she had been given in marriage as a result of a 
compromise arrived at by the jirga. She did so to protect her family and the 
members of the jirga. The latter generally assemble on the request of one or 
sometimes both parties involved. While local custom acknowledges giving of 
a female in marriage in order to solve a case of illicit relations or a blood feud, 
the law of the state forbids this (see case study 3). A large number of state/
Islamic laws contradict the traditional norms and values in general. This is 
particularly true for customs controlling sex and marriage issues among the 
local people. 
The Quranic punishment for illicit sexual relations is flogging or stoning 
of the culprits, carried out by the state or community, after at least four trust-
worthy eye witnesses testify having seen the accused inflagranti delicto.11 
In Chilas, the punishment of illicit relations is the killing of both man and 
woman by the immediate relatives of the woman (husband, brother, father, 
etc.), without any trustworthy eyewitnesses testifying  it or without any due 
process.12 Derived from this right is a killing based solely on suspicion and 
rumors about an illicit relation, the extreme case being the killing of the man 
who is suspected of trying to approach or getting the attention of a woman. 
11 Al-Quran xxiv: 1-64.
12 According to the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the “law for the tribes” which 
was established by the British and which is still at least theoretically in place, 
it was lawful for a husband to kill his wife and her paramour if he found them 
together. However, the Quran allows the following: "And for those who launch 
a charge against their spouses, and have (in support) no evidence but their 
own. Their solitary evidence (can be received) if they bear witness four times 
(with an oath) by Allah that they are solemnly telling the truth ... But it would 
avert the punishment from the wife, if she bears witness four times (with an 
oath) by Allah, that (her husband) is telling a lie" (Al-Quran xxiv: 6-8). This 
means a charge has to be launched and a decision has to be made.
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In such cases it is only the men who are killed. My data shows that the over-
whelming majority of the murders are based on rumors and suspicions of 
illicit sexual relations and only men are killed that lead to blood feuds. The 
characteristic feature of this system is that it is based on the private indi-
vidual’s conception of justice. The blood enmity could be brought to an end if 
the right to kill could be withdrawn from the individual.
If a man and a woman are caught in flagranti delicto, according to the 
local customs both could be killed. If both are killed, normally no blood re-
venge follows. It is important that both must be killed together on the spot. 
If they are killed in different places, blood revenge may be taken. Similarly, if 
the family of the murdered man does not accept the charge, revenge may also 
be taken. An example of this is as follows: Zafaran’s sister in the case present-
ed at the very beginning in this article, and her paramour were seen together 
in the fields. The brothers took out their rifles and killed both of them on the 
spot. One of Zafaran’s brothers presented himself before the police and de-
clared that he had killed his sister and her lover on the spot as he saw them 
making love. In the village, there were other stories told which differed from 
the story told by the family of Zafaran. For example it was told that the family 
of the man killed was very poor and that he was the only son. The real affair 
of the woman was with another rich man but the family of Zafaran did not 
dare to start a feud with that family. The affair was known in the village and 
this was a good chance to restore the ghairat (which may be translated here 
as manliness) of Zafaran. The brothers of Zafaran, though collaborators, sent 
the youngest of the brothers, who was jobless, to confess to the assassination. 
The eldest brother who had actually killed them remained in the background 
to arrange his release. The peace was concluded between the two families 
and Zafaran’s brother was set free within less than six months.
The cases of Said Noor and Javaid are other examples from the area: 
One was killed as the result of a rumor and the other killed only out of suspi-
cion. When Javaid came home he found his neighbor in his house where his 
sister was alone; he took his rifle and killed him on the spot. The woman fled 
to the police. The medical examination of the woman proved her innocence. 
Peace was arranged between the two families and Javaid was released. In the 
other case, Said Noor went to drink water at the house of his cousin who was 
not at home. When Said Noor was coming out of the house some neighbors 
saw him and rumor spread that he had an affair. His cousin killed him some 
months later. There were attempts to make peace but the family of Said Noor 
was against peace. It is sometimes mentioned that men kill their wives to-
gether with an enemy to get rid of both an enemy and an unwanted wife. But 
such killing could give rise to a double feud since the family of the wife would 
want to seek revenge for her murder.
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The consent of the couple at the wedding is the basic requirement for any 
marriage according to the state law. Among the locals,13 however, such an 
expression of the couple’s intention is neither sought nor even considered 
decent, especially in the case of the bride. Similarly, eloping adults do not 
commit an offence under the official law while this is a grave crime, deser-
ving death, according to the local customs. A simple engagement is of little 
consequence in the state law but is treated almost equivalent to a marriage 
in the local culture. Swara, as we have already stated above, is a crime in the 
state law.
The individual is held responsible and becomes the target of punish-
ments in the state law. Marriage, sex, divorce, etc. are seen as individual acts 
and their decisions are assumed to be made by individuals. Following this 
ideology, in the case study 3, the sister cannot be punished (given in mar-
riage) for the crime (eloping) of the brother. In Diamer society, on the other 
hand, the values are such that groups like a family act as a corporate unit and 
the consequences of individual actions are also born collectively. In the case 
study 3 the elopement had an impact on the honor of the whole family and 
even the tribe of the eloping woman and her fiancée and his family. Similarly, 
the target of the revenge is not the single individual but the whole group un-
less the offender family on its own kills the individual responsible for dam-
aging the honor of the other family. The target groups are of course clearly 
defined and they vary depending upon the situation following the principle of 
fission and fusion in segmentary systems (Barth 1959, Ahmed 1976).
In our case study 3 Tariq was engaged to his cousin. She eloped with 
Imran. The jirga decided that Maryam, the sister of Imran, should be given 
to Tariq in marriage. Maryam, being not involved at all, is punished for the 
crime of her brother, Imran. When I asked Pukhtun female students of my 
M.A. class at Quaid-i-Azam University they were unanimous in their views 
that they would accept the role of a swara women if such an incident hap-
pened in their families. It is pertinent to mention that in feuds, women, chil-
dren and old men are generally considered neutral and thus never directly 
targeted or killed in blood feuds. Comparable to swara, though actually ex-
perienced even more rarely, is a woman of the feuding party going to the 
house of the opponents with a request to end the feud. Pukhtunwali demands 
the awarding of full respect to the visiting woman and generally her action 
would terminate the feud. Only in very rare cases, women give testimony 
against their fathers or brothers upon whom they depend. People live in joint 
or extended families and their fates are very closely linked together. Local 
13 A Pukhtun female university student whose life is at risk for refusing 
engagement with her cousin arranged by her father told me that the opinion 
and consent of the future brides and grooms are not only not sought it is 
disliked by their families. She told me, for instance, that if a parent wanted 
to marry a woman to her cousin but she expresses her liking for that cousin 
before the proposal, her parents will then not marry her to that cousin. 
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people may have sympathy with the swara woman but consider it justified 
for a greater cause – saving lives of brothers and fathers. 
Similarly, it is not only the swara-women who are not asked or consult-
ed for their marriages – generally the consent of marrying couples is irrel-
evant. Similarly, childhood engagements and marriages are quite common. 
The swara-women that are given in exchange for either a murdered man or 
an engaged woman who eloped with another man is not so different from 
the ‘normal’ marriage of a woman. At the time of marriage the family of the 
woman receives a sum of money as a bride-wealth. The idea and amount of 
bride wealth differ from family to family and tribe to tribe and even from 
bride to bride, depending upon her beauty, for example. Some changes have 
taken place in this custom in the meanwhile. Some fathers keep most of the 
bride-money for themselves while others are spending all incoming money 
– and even more than it – on gifts for the bride and the wedding. Almost uni-
versal is the idea that the woman becomes the ‘property’ of her husband and 
his family after marriage. If a married or even an engaged woman runs away 
with another man it will therefore be her fiancée who is to be paid the com-
pensation. Similarly, if a husband dies early and the woman is still young, her 
in-laws will decide about her future, as for example, who will marry her then 
(Mehdi 2002: 147-178). Punishment of sisters for the crimes of their brothers 
has, similarly, to be seen in the collective family perspective. Death, prison, 
failure and success of each individual member of the family – especially of 
male members in this context – is the failure or success, punishment or re-
ward of the whole family. For instance, if a brother or father is killed, all other 
family members including daughters and sisters are affected. Similarly, the 
good or bad reputation of one member affects the entire family. The punish-
ment of the sister or the daughter is actually a punishment of the whole family. 
Explaining this should not be understood as a defense of swara. What I 
want to emphasize is simply that swara is part of a whole value system relat-
ing to sex, marriage and family. It is crucial to mention here that swara is 
practiced only in exceptional cases. The custom ideally demands the killing 
of the eloped couple.
Discussion and Conclusion
Conflicts frequently occur between close relatives especially cousins, called 
tarbur, a term which means both cousin and enemy. It is no coincidence that 
all three case studies involved cousins. For instance in our case study 1 three 
brothers declared the three daughters of their uncle who has refused to give 
them in marriage to his nephews, ghag i.e. their future brides. The uncle dis-
graced them by refusing the hands of his daughters and they took revenge by 
declaring these women as their brides. 
Let us now jump from the conflicts in close kinship units to violence 
between large groups based on territories (Kohistan vs Diamer), ethnic (Shin 
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vs Yeshkun) or religious groups, i.e. Shias vs Sunnis. I have already quoted in 
the introduction the recent clashes between two territorial units i.e. Diamer 
and Kohistan, both of whom are Sunni. ‘Lashkars (civil armies) took posi-
tions on the opposite mountain sides, seven people were killed and a large 
number injured.’ This was not different from the lashkar of 1988 that I have 
already mentioned in the beginning of the article which went to fight Shias of 
Gilgit. There were rumors in Chilas at that time that Shias killed some Sunni 
in Gilgit and that they had further plans to attack and kill other Sunnis in 
Gilgit. 
We know from the relevant literature that the Shia-Sunni clashes in the 
GB are older than the British rule. Biddulph wrote, for instance, that ‘Being 
Soonees [Sunni], every Shiah who falls into their hand is put to death (…)” 
(1977: 15). We may not know the exact reason behind the start of Shia-Sunni 
violence in the region but for this analysis more relevant aspect of this vio-
lence is the characteristic feature of blood enmity that once started it runs for 
generations. A feud actually never ends unless and until there was a settle-
ment between the concerned individuals and groups organized by the jirga. 
Even this may not be a guarantee for ever. I remember, at least, one case from 
Chilas in which a stranger came and just killed a man on the spot. Later on 
it turned out that the grandfather of the man killed had fled his area after 
killing and that the killer was grandson of that person. 
The Chilasis complain that the state machinery (government, police, 
hospitals, etc.) and media, etc. was in the hands of Shia in Gilgit and that it 
is used against Sunni. They were of the view that when Sunnis are killed in 
Gilgit there is hardly any reporting in the media.  Nobody takes any action 
against the killers because of Shia Government in Gilgit. The Sunnis in Gilgit 
are migrants from Chilas and Kohistan who still have relatives living here. 
Whenever a Sunni is killed in Gilgit we stand an obligation to revenge that 
killing. 
The Shia population of GB complains that Chilasi and Kohistani are reli-
gious fanatics and brutal and they kill Shia. I do not agree with the assertion 
that Chilasi are religious fanatics. Chilasi society is a tribal society where in 
the absence of any or effective system of justice badal serves as deterrence. 
This is what Max Gluckman calls ‘peace in the feud’ (Gluckman 1973: 3). The 
reason that they do not tolerate Shias in their region is because they seem to 
have an old enmity with them. If they were Sunni religious fanatics then they 
would kill any non-Sunni/Muslim and not only Shias, for instance Ismails, 
Christians, etc. I was part of a research group consisting of mainly Germans 
and some Ismail from Hunza, who lived and worked in Chilas for more than 
three decades. Nothing happened ever. I think if one respects the Chilasi cul-
ture and knows how to behave, one will have no trouble there.
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